Abstract
In the first part of this chapter, we shall argue that the legal regime under which most of the COVID-19 measures were adopted in Cyprus is problematic both from the standpoint of the democratic principle and from the standpoint of the meta-principle of rule of law. In the second part, in the context of an analysis of the path that the Republic of Cyprus did not follow, i.e. a Proclamation of Emergency under Art. 183 of the Constitution, we shall see how a “compulsion of legality” (Dyzenhaus) was incorporated into the emergency doctrine upon which the operation of the constitutional order of Cyprus has been based since 1964. The doctrine of necessity in Cyprus illustrates the potential of the rule of law even in emergencies. The “compulsion of legality” which animates the Cypriot version of the doctrine of necessity affirms the importance of legislative action and of judicial review. At least on COVID-19 measures, this compulsion should orient courts away from constructions (such as the doctrine of “actes de gouvernement”) which insulate executive action from judicial scrutiny.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Democracy after Covid |
Subtitle of host publication | Challenges in Europe and Beyond |
Publisher | Springer International Publishing |
Pages | 91-109 |
Number of pages | 19 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783031139017 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783031139000 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jan 2022 |
Keywords
- actes de gouvernement
- Compulsion of legality
- Doctrine of necessity
- Emergency
- Restrictions of fundamental rights
- Rule of law