The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation

Adamos Vlittis, Melita Charitou

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 firm-year observations from both conference call and non-conference call firms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntary disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in firms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as investors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)80-91
    Number of pages12
    JournalResearch in International Business and Finance
    Volume27
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2013

    Keywords

    • Capital markets
    • Conference calls
    • Executive compensation
    • Voluntary disclosures

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